In a computing system, sensitive data must be protected by release policies that determine which principals are authorized to access that data. In some cases, such a release policy could refer to information about the requesting principal that is unavailable to the information provider. Furthermore, the release policy itself may contain sensitive information about the resource that it protects. In this paper we describe a scheme for enforcing information release policies whose satisfaction cannot be verified by the entity holding the protected information, but only by the entity requesting this information. Not only does our scheme prevent the information provider from learning whether the policy was satisfied, but it also hides the information release policy being enforced from the requesting principal. Unlike previous approaches, our construction requires no guesswork or wasted computation on the part of the information requester. The information release policies that we consider can contain third-party assertions that themselves have release conditions that must be satisfied; we show that our system functions correctly even when these dependencies form cycles.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we consider an access control setting in which Alice would like to obtain a secret s from Bob, but Bob has a policy requiring that a conjunction of quoted assertions made by other principals must be true before s can be disclosed to Alice. By a "quoted assertion" we mean a proposition of the form pi says ei, where ei is an arbitrary expression that can be asserted by some principal pi; the quoted assertion pi says ei is true if pi is willing to assert ei. For example, ei may be the assertion that Alice has some attribute (e.g., that Alice is a student), and pi may be an authority trusted by Bob to know whether Alice does in fact have the attribute in question (e.g., the registrar at an accredited university).
If Bob is able to determine the truth of each proposition pi says ei in his release policy for s, then he can decide whether to release s to Alice without any further interaction with her. But Bob's policy may also refer to private attributes of Alice that he is not authorized to learn about directly from the relevant authority. In this case, Bob could ask Alice to prove that she satisfies his policy by obtaining digitally signed credentials attesting to the truth of each quoted assertion that he cannot evaluate himself. This solution may be unsatisfactory for both parties, however. On the one hand, Bob may have to reveal parts of his policy that he considers sensitive to Alice, as the release policy for a secret can reveal information about the secret itself. On the other, Alice may have to disclose the truth of quoted assertions that she considers private to Bob.
If there were a universally trusted third party (TTP), solving this problem would be simple: Bob discloses his secret s and its release policy p to the TTP, which queries principals about the truth of the quoted assertions in p and releases s to Alice if and only if p is satisfied. Alice learns nothing about Bob's policy aside from whether it was satisfied (unless she is queried by the TTP herself), Bob does not learn whether Alice receives the secret, and no expensive cryptography is needed. In this paper we show that a simple and computationally efficient solution is possible even without a TTP if Bob has a basic level of trust in the principals whose quoted assertions his policy depends on. Specifically, Bob must only trust these principals not to reveal their interactions with Bob to Alice. In our approach, Bob does not have to be able to learn the truth value of a quoted assertion in his policy if Alice is allowed to do so, while Alice learns no more about Bob's policy than she would learn from in-teracting with a TTP. Because Bob does not learn whether his policy was satisfied, we say that our protocol permits the oblivious enforcement of a hidden information release policy. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the intuition behind our construction, while the full protocol details are given in Section 3. Section 4 presents a sample run. We briefly compare our approach to related work in Section 5, and summarize in Section 6.
PROTOCOL INTUITION
Our construction relies on a public-key encryption scheme supporting a multiplicative homomorphism. In such an encryption scheme, if E(m1) and E(m2) represent the encryptions of messages m1 and m2 using the same public key, then these two ciphertexts can be combined to yield E(m1 · m2) without knowledge of the private key required to decrypt E(m1) and E(m2). We further require that the encryption scheme have the property of IND-CPA security, or indistinguishability of ciphertexts under chosen-plaintext attack, which ensures that no information can be obtained about the plaintext corresponding to a given ciphertext without knowledge of the private key. A concrete example of an encryption scheme with these properties is ElGamal encryption [5] using a group in which the decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [1] holds.
Suppose that a principal p0 wishes to obtain a secret s from principal p1, but that p1 is only willing to disclose s to p0 if certain conditions-the release policy for s-hold. We model p1's release policy for s as a set of quoted assertions of the form pi says ei, where ei is any expression that can be evaluated to a Boolean value by pi. If p1's release policy requires that some of these assertions must be true simultaneously, then each relevant ei should include the constraint that the expression must evaluate to true throughout a time interval long enough to ensure that the expressions are simultaneously true at some point in time despite any clock differences between the principals.
Since p1 can trivially enforce the part of a release policy that depends only on information that it can obtain from its local knowledge, credentials provided by p0, or other principals in the system, we will assume in the following discussion that the release policy for s can be evaluated as satisfied or unsatisfied entirely on the basis of the truth values of quoted assertions p2 says e2, . . . , pn says en, where p2, . . . , pn are willing to disclose the truth values of these assertions to p0, but not to p1. (A release policy that depends on information available to neither p0 nor p1 cannot be evaluated without the help of a third party.) We also assume that s can be encoded as a short binary string of perhaps 128 bits, since this is sufficient for a symmetric key that can be used by p0 to decrypt additional data or as proof of authorization.
Given these assumptions, p1 can ask each pi ∈ {p2, . . . , pn} to evaluate the corresponding expression ei from p1's release policy. This expression may involve information that pi is willing to reveal to p0, but not to p1. In order to assert the truth of the expression ei, pi encrypts the value 1 for p0's public key using an IND-CPA-secure homomorphic encryption scheme and returns the ciphertext to p1; otherwise, pi encrypts a random value and returns the resulting ciphertext. These ciphertexts reveal no information at all to p1 because of the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme. Now p1 encrypts the secret s using p0's public key, homomorphically combines the encryption of s with each of the ciphertexts received from p2, . . . , pn, and finally sends the combined ciphertext to p0. If the quoted assertions p2 says e2, . . . , pn says en from p1's release policy were all true, then p0 receives the encryption of s, since homomorphically combining the encryption of s with the encryption of 1 has no effect. Otherwise, one of the ciphertexts that p1 received from p2, . . . , pn must have been the encryption of a random value, so p0 receives the encryption of s multiplied by a random value, which contains no more information than the random value. In either case, p0 learns nothing about the structure of p1's policy or the fact that p2, . . . , pn were involved in enforcing it, since p0 always receives a single ciphertext from p1. If p0 fails to obtain s by decrypting the ciphertext, then this fact may simply indicate that p1 determined that the release policy for s was unsatisfied based on p1's local knowledge. In the following section, we describe this solution in more detail, including how p2, . . . , pn can enforce release policies of their own on the truth values of the assertions that they evaluate.
PROTOCOL DETAILS
Let M denote the message space of the IND-CPA-secure homomorphic encryption scheme, Ep i (m) denote the encryption of message m using principal pi's public key, and Ep i (m1)⊗Ep i (m2) = Ep i (m1 ·m2) denote the homomorphic combination of two ciphertexts encrypted using pi's public key. We will assume that principals can obtain one another's public keys and that all communication takes place over secure and authenticated channels. As before, we use p0 to denote the principal who wishes to obtain a secret s1 ∈ M and p1 to denote the principal in possession of this secret.
Core Protocol
The secret requester p0 first sends a message to p1 asking for its secret s1, along with a newly generated globally unique session identifier sid. Upon receiving this request, p1 contacts each principal pi listed in its release policy for s1 and asks it to evaluate the corresponding assertion ei. The session identifier sid generated by p0 is passed along with this request. At this point, p1 may replace s1 with a random value if p1 decides that p0 is not authorized to receive s1 based on information available to p1.
Each principal pi contacted by p1 selects a local secret si based on the result of evaluating ei. If ei is true and pi is (conditionally) willing to disclose this to p0 via p1, then si is set to 1; otherwise, si is an element of the message space M chosen uniformly at random. If pi is willing to unconditionally reveal si to p0, then pi simply returns Ep 0 (si) to p1. Otherwise, pi can make the disclosure of the truth value of ei contingent upon the truth of a set of quoted assertions of the same form as p1's release policy for s1 by homomorphically combining Ep 0 (si) with additional ciphertexts as described below. In either case, p1 homomorphically combines the ciphertext returned by each pi with Ep 0 (s1), the encryption of the secret requested by p0, and returns the final ciphertext to p0.
It may initially seem as though any principal pi contacted by p1 can enforce its release policy for si in exactly the same manner as p1 enforces its release policy for s1. This is almost the case, but a problem arises when the release policies of several principals create a cycle of quoted assertions in which the disclosure of each assertion depends on the disclosure of another assertion in the cycle. The purpose of the session identifier passed along with each request is to enable principals to detect and break such cycles.
Policy Cycle Resolution
The basic idea of the algorithm that we will present below is that when a requesting principal pr contacts a principal pi to ask about some assertion ei, pi must ensure that the ciphertext that is returned to pr is the encryption of a random value if any quoted assertion pj says ej in pi's release policy for the truth value of ei is false. If pi always waits for pj to return a ciphertext corresponding to the truth value of ej before pi returns an answer to pr, however, a policy cycle will cause a deadlock.
Our solution is for pi to provisionally act as though the required ciphertext cj from pj was the encryption of a random value if a request for cj was previously sent in the current session but no reply has yet been received. That is, pi homomorphically combines the ciphertext ci that it will return to the requesting principal pr with the encryption of a newly generated random value. When the real response cj from pj is eventually received, a number of these random values, r1, r2, . . . , rn, may have been used, but pi can undo the effect of r1, r2, . . . , rn by computing (r1r2 · · · rn) −1 and homomorphically combining the encryption of this quantity with cj. Since every ciphertext encrypted for p0 in a session is eventually combined into a single ciphertext, (r1r2 · · · rn) −1 will cancel out r1r2 · · · rn in the final ciphertext received by p0.
Specifically, each principal pi maintains a product table indexed by the name of a principal, an assertion, and a session identifier. The product r1r2 · · · rn of all the random values that pi generates while waiting for an answer from pj concerning assertion ej in session sid is stored in table entry product[pj, ej, sid] and pj's answer cj is combined with the encryption of product[pj, ej, sid] −1 when cj becomes available. Upon receiving a query concerning ei from a requesting principal pr in a session initiated by p0 and identified by sid, pi initializes the ciphertext ci that will be returned to pr with Ep 0 (si), where si = 1 if ei is true and pi is (conditionally) willing to disclose this to p0 via pr, and si is a freshly chosen random element of the message space M otherwise. Then pi consults its release policy for disclosing the truth value of ei to p0 via principal pr to obtain a list of quoted assertions of the form pj says ej. For each assertion pj says ej in this list, there are now two possible cases:
• If pi is not currently waiting for a reply from pj about ej in the current session, then pi queries pj about ej (also sending the session identifier sid) and assigns 1 to product[pj, ej, sid]. When pj eventually replies with a ciphertext cj, pi homomorphically combines both cj and the encryption of product[pj, ej, sid] −1 with the ciphertext ci that will be returned to pr: ci ← ci ⊗ cj ⊗ Ep 0 (product[pj, ej, sid] −1 ).
• If pi has previously contacted pj about ej but has not yet received a reply (possibly because this is the second time around a cycle of quoted assertions), then pi chooses a random element r from M and multiplies product[pj, ej, sid] by r: product[pj, ej, sid] ← product[pj, ej, sid] · r. Then pi homomorphically combines the encryption of r with the ciphertext ci that will be returned to pr: ci ← ci ⊗ Ep 0 (r).
Finally, pi returns the resulting ciphertext ci to pr.
While pi may be tempted to cache a ciphertext cj received from principal pj so that pi will never need to query pj more than once about any assertion within a single session, this is inadvisable because the same random value would be reused multiple times if cj was the encryption of a randomly chosen element of the message space. That is, reusing cj would not be indistinguishable from using a fresh element of the message space chosen uniformly at random.
AN EXAMPLE
Suppose that Alice is a reporter who has heard a rumor about a certain government agency. She asks Bob, who works at this agency, whether the rumor is true (this is Bob's secret sB). Bob is willing to tell sB to Alice if his superior Carol says that it is all right (Carol says eC ). Carol is not willing to say that it is all right unless David also approves (David says eD), while David is not willing to say that it is all right unless Carol approves (Carol says eC ). Suppose that Carol and David both approve of Bob telling Alice the secret, so eC and eD are true.
In our protocol, Alice first contacts Bob, who contacts Carol, which causes Carol to contact David, who then contacts Carol again. At this point the chain ends, since Carol has already contacted David concerning eD in the current session. The ciphertexts passed back up the chain from Carol to Alice are shown in Figure 1 . At the end of the chain, Carol has not yet received a reply from David concerning eD, so she chooses a random element r from M and sets product[David, eD, sid] ← r. The encryption of r is combined with the encryption of Carol's secret sC (which is 1, since eC is true), and the resulting ciphertext is then returned to David. At this stage Carol has revealed no information about her secret value sC , since it is completely obscured by multiplication with the random value r.
Upon receiving E Alice (rsC ) from Carol, David combines it with the encryption of his secret sD (which is also 1 in this case, because eD is true) and passes the resulting ciphertext up the chain to Carol. While David does not know that this ciphertext contains the random factor r, he can assume that it contains the factor sC , which would be a random value that conceals David's secret sD unless eC is true. Upon receiving the combined ciphertext from David, Carol cancels out the random factor r that she added earlier by combining E Alice (rsC sD) with E Alice (product[David, eD, sid] −1 ) = E Alice (r −1 ). Carol also multiplies the combined secret by sC for a second time, but this has no effect since sC = 1 (if eC were false, then Carol would use a new random value for sC each time she is queried about eC ). Although r has now been removed from the ciphertext, Carol's secret sC is protected by the inclusion of the factor sD. When Bob receives the combined ciphertext from Carol, he contributes sB, yielding E Alice (rr −1 sBs 2 C sD). Since rr −1 = 1 and s 2 C sD = 1, Bob's response to Alice is just E Alice (sB). Thus Alice has no reason to believe that Bob has consulted anyone about releasing his secret value sB.
RELATED WORK
Hidden credentials [7, 2] , oblivious signature-based envelope (OSBE) [9] , and multiauthority attribute-based encryption [3, 4] are cryptographic mechanisms that allow a message to be protected by a release policy whose satisfaction is verified by the recipient of the message. In hidden creden- tials and OSBE, a message is encrypted in such a way that only a recipient who possesses certain digital credentials can decrypt the message. The identity of the intended recipient needs to be known to the message sender when this information is included in the recipient's digital credentials, as is usually the case. In multiauthority attribute-based encryption, a ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes such that any user who has been issued decryption keys (possibly by different authorities) that correspond to a satisfying set of attributes can decrypt the message. Thus no knowledge of the identities of potential recipients is needed at the time of message encryption. Unlike our work, however, in all of these schemes decrypting the message implies knowledge of at least one way of satisfying the sender's release policy. Protocols based on scrambled circuit evaluation can be used to allow an information provider to keep a release policy partially hidden even when a message recipient satisfies the provider's policy. The three schemes of progressively greater complexity presented in [6] respectively reveal a superset of the attributes in the policy, the number of attributes in the policy that are satisfied, and an upper bound on the total number of attributes in the policy. Nevertheless, these "hidden policies with hidden credentials" protocols still require the message recipient to supply a set of credentials that potentially satisfies the unknown policy. In our system, the issuers of the credentials would be contacted directly by the information provider without any participation from the recipient; the trade-off, of course, is that partial information about the policy is revealed to the credential issuers.
Our work is also related to the notion of confidentialitypreserving distributed proof introduced in [8] , which allows information providers to place release conditions that are verified by the querier on facts used in distributed inference. On the one hand, these release conditions need to be known to the querier, unlike the hidden dependencies in our protocol, but on the other, information providers communicate only with the querier and not with one another, which hides the source of dependency relationships from the providers of facts that satisfy those dependencies.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have described a scheme for enforcing information release policies whose satisfaction cannot be verified by the principal holding the protected information, but only by the principal requesting this information. Our construction hides the information release policy being enforced from the requesting principal and at the same time hides whether the release policy was satisfied from the information provider. The quoted assertions in the information release policy can themselves have release conditions that must be satisfied and our system functions correctly even when these dependencies form cycles.
